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The Constitutional Case for Independence 
Aileen McHarg 
I. Introduction 
7KHLQGHSHQGHQFHUHIHUHQGXPKDVEHHQDSWO\GHVFULEHGDVDQµDFFLGHQWDOUHIHUHQGXP¶1  
It was accidental, first, in the sense that the condition that made the holding of a referendum 
possible ± the election in 2011 of a majority Scottish National Party (SNP) government at 
Holyrood ± was just not supposed to happen.  The electoral system for the Scottish 
Parliament was designed deliberately to avoid single-party majority government.  More 
fundamentally, by responding to Scottish demands for self-government, devolution itself was 
expected ± by some at least ± to kill off demand for independence.2 
In fact, WKH613¶VHOHFWLRQYLFWRU\GLGQRWVLJQDODQ\VWURQJSXEOLFGHVLUHIRULQGHSHQGHQFH
In 2011, popular support for independence was only around 25 ± 30 per cent, which was 
relatively low by historical standards,3 and the importance of the constitutional question 
compared to other electoral issues had also declined.4  The SNP therefore won the election in 
                                                          
1
 &0F&RUNLQGDOHµ$Q$FFLGHQWDO5HIHUHQGXP¶Scottish Constitutional Futures Forum Blog, 16 August 2013. 
2
 )RUPHU6HFUHWDU\RI6WDWHIRU6FRWODQG*HRUJH5REHUWVRQLVIDPRXVO\VDLGWRKDYHFODLPHGWKDWµ'HYROXWLRQ
ZLOONLOOQDWLRQDOLVPVWRQHGHDG¶ 
3
 ,SVRV0RUL¶<HDUVRI6FRWWLVK$WWLWXGHV7RZDUGV,QGHSHQGHQFH¶0DUFKDYDLODEOHDW
<https://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/2935/35-years-of-Scottish-attitudes-
towards-independence.aspx>.  But nb support for a referendum on independence was higher: see What Scotland 
Thinks at <http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/do-you-support-or-oppose-a-referendum-on-scottish-
independence#line>. 
4
 C. Carman, R. Johns and J. Mitchell, More Scottish than British: the 2011 Scottish Parliament Election 
(Palgrave Macmillan 2014) 87. 
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spite of not because of its commitment to hold a referendum on independence; simply 
EHFDXVHµPRVWYRWHUV WKRXJKW WKDW WKHSDUW\ZRXOGGRDEHWWHUMRELQRIILFHWKDQLWVULYDOV¶5  
Indeed, the commitment to hold a referendum before commencing negotiations on 
independence, rather than after the conclusion of such negotiations, as had been party policy 
until 2000, was a deliberate ± and highly successful ± tactic to decouple electoral support for 
the SNP from support for constitutional reform.6   
The second sense in which the 2014 referendum was accidental, then, was that it took place 
without any clear evidence of dissatisfaction with the constitutional status quo.7  This 
contrasted strongly with the 1997 referendum, when devolution was so clearly regarded as 
being LQ-RKQ6PLWK¶VSKUDVHµWKHVHWWOHGZLOORIWKH6FRWWLVKSHRSOH¶WKDWPDQ\KDGDUJXHG
that a referendum was unnecessary.8  Admittedly, the TXHVWLRQRI6FRWODQG¶V FRQVWLWXWLRQDO
future had been on the political agenda since 2007, when the then minority SNP government 
launched its National Conversation9 and the unionist parties responded by setting up the 
Calman Commission to review the operation of devolution.  But the Calman Commission 
found that devolution was popular, and considered that it had operated largely successfully.10  
Insofar as there was popular support for constitutional reform, therefore, it was for more 
                                                          
5
 R. Johns et al µ&RQVWLWXWLRQRU&RPSHWHQFH"7KH613¶V5H-ElecWLRQLQ¶Political Studies 158 
at 158. 
6
 D. Torrance The Battle for Britain: Scotland and the Independence Referendum (Biteback Publishing 2013) 9 
± 10. 
7
 McCorkindale (n 1). 
8
 See A. King The British Constitution (Oxford University Press 2007) 290. 
9
 Scottish Government &KRRVLQJ6FRWODQG¶V)XWXUH$1DWLRQDO&RQYHUVDWLRQ,QGHSHQGHQFHDQG5HVSRQVLELOLW\
in the Modern World (2007). 
10
 Commission on Scottish Devolution Serving Scotland Better: Scotland and the United Kingdom in the 21st 
Century (2009) 
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devolution, rather than independence.  However, the United Kingdom (UK) government was 
unwilling to countenance a second referendum question on further devolution ± ostensibly, 
inter alia, because independence and further devolution were distinct constitutional issues,11 
but also presumably because they thought that on a straightforward choice between 
independence and the status quo, independence would be comfortably defeated.  In any case, 
as unionists frequently pointed out, further devolution was already being delivered via the 
Scotland Act 2012, which had been enacted in response to the Calman Commission¶V
recommendations.  
If by 2011 there was no strongly-felt constitutional grievance to which independence was the 
answer, nor was the subsequent referendum debate conducted primarily in constitutional 
terms.  As other chapters in this volume have noted,12 once the debate moved beyond the 
early preoccupation with process issues, it was dominated by discussion of the substantive ± 
and particularly the economic ± effects of independence on public policy in Scotland and on 
the lives of its residents.  This again contrasts sharply with devolution, which proceeded on a 
FOHDUO\DUWLFXODWHGDQDO\VLVRIWKHGHIHFWVLQ6FRWODQG¶VWKHQJRYHUQDQFHDUUDQJHPHQWVDQGRI
the constitutional right of the Scottish people to secure enhanced self-government.13 
                                                          
11
 See I. McLean, J. Gallagher and G. Lodge 6FRWODQG¶V&KRLFHV7KH5HIHUHQGXPDQG:KDW+DSSHQV
Afterwards (Edinburgh University Press 2013) 9 ± 14. 
12
 See Gallagher and Scott. 
13
 See Campaign for a Scottish Assembly A Claim of Right for Scotland: Report of the Constitutional Steering 
Committee (1988); Scottish Constitutional Convention Towards a Scottish Parliament: Consultation Document 
and Report to the Scottish People (1989); Scottish Constitutional Convention Towards the Scottish Parliament: 
a Report to the Scottish People (1990; Scottish Constitutional Convention 6FRWODQG¶V3DUOLDPHQW6FRWODQG¶V
Right (1995). 
4 
 
The substantive nature of the referendum debate is largely attributable to the fact that the 
Scottish Government chose to base its case for constitutional change not around an 
existentialist nationalist claim ± that Scotland, being a nation, should also be a state (although 
such arguments undoubtedly were made by independence supporters, for instance in claims 
WKDW LQGHSHQGHQFH ZRXOG PDNH 6FRWODQG D µQRUPDO¶ FRXQWU\), or that independence was 
necessary to preserve Scottish identity.  Rather, the appeal was to a utilitarian nationalism, 
which saw independence as a tool to achieve a better society.14  This approach had the 
advantage of enabling many people who did not identify as Nationalists (at least with a 
capital N), and who continued to feel some degree of Britishness, to support the Yes 
campaign on the basis that an independent Scotland would better able to deliver progressive 
policy outcomes.  Its disadvantage was that it was vulnerable to counter-arguments that an 
independent Scotland would in fact be less able to achieve such policy outcomes,15 and to 
claims ± made particularly by Labour politicians ± that the constitutional debate was a 
distraction from the real business of improving the lives of Scottish people.   
However, what these counter-arguments arguably failed fully to appreciate, and therefore 
adequately to address, was the fact that the instrumental case for independence was 
XQGHUSLQQHGE\DFULWLTXHRI6FRWODQG¶VFXUUHQWJRYHUQDQFHDUUDQJHPHQWV([FHSWLQVRIDUDV
it was based on crude arguments about the assignment of tax revenues or the allocation of 
natural resources (arguments which were undoubtedly made, but which operated more as 
reasons why Scotland could be independent, rather why it should), the instrumental case 
                                                          
14
 6HHLQSDUWLFXODU16WXUJHRQµ%ULQJLQJWKH3RZHUV+RPHWR%XLOGD%HWWHU1DWLRQ¶6SHHFKDW6WUDWKFO\GH 
University, 3 December 2012. 
15
 See Gallagher, in this volume, and for a more optimistic assessment of the likely economic effects of 
independence, see Scott, in this volume. 
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necessarily assumed that an independent Scotland would be able to govern itself differently 
and better than would be possible if it were to remain part of the UK. 
Thus, contrary to initial impressions, there was a constitutional case for independence, which 
was made with varying degrees of explicitness.  Moreover, this was a case which strongly 
echoed the constitutional case that had been made for devolution a generation earlier. 
The aim of this chapter is to elucidate that constitutional case, which, I contend, was based 
around four sets of (intertwined, but conceptually distinct) arguments: about a democratic 
GHILFLW DERXW HIIHFWLYH JRYHUQDQFH DERXW WKH SODFH RI 6FRWODQG LQ WKH 8.¶V WHUULWRULDO
constitution; and about the constitution of an independent Scotland.  The chapter also seeks to 
evaluate the strength of these arguments, particularly in the light of the referendum itself and 
subsequent events.  It is important to appreciate that the referendum was not merely an 
opportunity to pass jXGJPHQW RQ 6FRWODQG¶s constitutional arrangements, but was itself a 
constitutionally significant event which shaped perceptions of those arrangements.  Thus, the 
referendum debate has served to focus and intensify constitutional dissatisfaction, which 
subsequent opinion polls and political developments suggest has certainly not weakened and 
may even have become stronger.16  The argument advanced in this chapter is that while none 
of the four constitutional claims made by Yes campaigners individually amounts to a 
compelling case for independence, cumulatively they seem likely to become harder to resist, 
particularly if post-referendum political and constitutional trends continue.   
II. A democratic deficit 
The most frequently invoked constitutional argument in favour of independence was the idea 
of a democratic deficit; in other words, that independence is the only way to guarantee that 
                                                          
16
 See What Scotland Thinks at <http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/how-would-you-vote-in-the-in-the-
scottish-independence-referendum-if
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Scotland always gets the government it votes for.17  The claimed democratic deficit in 
6FRWODQG¶V WKHQ system of government was of course one of the key justifications for the 
establishment of the Scottish Parliament.  It was the election of four successive Conservative 
governments at Westminster between 1979 and 1997, during a period in which the party had 
only minority ± and declining ± electoral support in Scotland,18 which provided a clear 
rationale for devolution19 and persuaded a substantial majority of voters to support it.  The 
ability of the government to impose unpopular policies (such as the poll tax) on Scotland 
came to be perceived not merely as µWKHSURGXFWRIDQRFFDVLRQDODEHUUDWLRQE\DSDUWLFXODU
%ULWLVKJRYHUQPHQW>EXWDV@DFRQVHTXHQFHRIIODZVLQWKHV\VWHPRIJRYHUQPHQW¶20  
However, the Scottish Government argued, devolution µKDVRQO\EHHQD partial solution to the 
democratic deficit.¶21  Significant policy issues, on which Scottish preferences might diverge 
from those of voters in the rest of the UK (rUK), continue to be dealt with at UK level, and 
this necessarily must be the case even under the most generous devolution arrangements.  
Moreover, Scottish policy-making in devolved areas continues to be constrained by policy 
preferences at UK level, most significantly to the extent that the funding of the devolved 
institutions remains tied to expenditure levels in England via the Barnett formula, but also 
through UK government control of European Union (EU) and other international decision-
making, and through the continued existence of GB-wide political party structures and policy 
communities.  This was a point emphasized by the Scottish Government in the latter stages of 
                                                          
17
 See, eg, Scottish Government 6FRWODQG¶V)XWXUH<RXU*XLGHWRDQ,QGHSHQGHQW6FRWODQG (2013) xii, 41. 
18
 Conservative representation in Scotland declined from 22 (out of 71 seats) at the 1979 general election to just 
11 seats in 1992 ± House of Commons Library UK Election Statistics 1918- 2012, Research Paper 12/43 (2012) 
11. 
19
 See Kidd and Petrie, in this volume. 
20
 Claim of Right (n 13) at para 8.4. 
21
 6FRWODQG¶)XWXUH(n 17) at 333. 
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the referendum campaign, when it highlighted the threat to the NHS in Scotland from the 
pursuit of privatization in England.  Thus, independence was presented as a means of 
completing the democratic reform process begun by devolution.22   
It is important to appreciate that the force of the democratic deficit argument ± both as a 
justification for devolution and for independence ± lies not merely in the temporary 
divergence of electoral majorities in Scotland and the UK as a whole (which could be 
resolved by a change of government at Westminster), but in the lack of control that Scottish 
voters have over the outcome of UK elections.  The basic problem is the dominance of 
England, which has 84 per cent of the UK population.23  As the independence White Paper 
pointed out, this means that constituency results for Scotland rarely affect the outcome of UK 
general elections; in only two general elections held since 1945 have Scottish votes made a 
difference, and those governments held office for less than 26 months in total.24  This in turn 
means, it was claimed, that in order to win elections, parties have to present policies which 
appeal to voters in other parts of the UK whose voting patterns differ markedly from those in 
Scotland.25   
According to the 1988 Claim of Right ± the document which may be regarded as providing 
the political foundation for devolution ± WKH FRQVWLWXWLRQDO IODZ LQ6FRWODQG¶VPDFKLQHU\RI
                                                          
22
 See, eg, Scottish Government 6FRWODQG¶V)XWXUHIURPWKH5HIHUHQGXPWR,QGHSHQGHQFHDQGD:ULWWHQ
Constitution (2013) para 1.1. 
23
 2IILFHIRU1DWLRQDO6WDWLVWLFVµ0LG-<HDU3RSXODWLRQ(VWLPDWHVIRUWKH8.¶
<http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/pop-estimate/population-estimates-for-uk--england-and-wales--scotland-and-
northern-ireland/mid-2014/mid-year-population-estimates-for-the-uk-2014.html>. 
24
 6FRWODQG¶V)XWXUH (n 17) at 333 ± 334. 
25
 6FRWODQG¶V)XWXUH (n 17) at 334. 
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government was that it could only work within a limited range of election results.26  As 
0F&URQH SXWV LW µVR ORQJ DV 6FRWODQG DQG (QJODQG YRWHG PRUH RU OHVV WKH VDPH ZD\ WKH
constitutional anomaly whereby the United Kingdom always got a government the English 
YRWHG IRU GLG QRW PDWWHU¶27  But the anomaly became unsustainable when, from the 1960s 
onwards, voting patterns began to diverge.  This divergence shows no signs of diminishing 
and, indeed, became even more pronounced at the 2015 UK geQHUDO HOHFWLRQ  7KH 613¶V
near-clean sweep of the Scottish seats, and the refusal of the Britain-wide parties to 
countenance coalition, or even some lesser support arrangement with it, effectively locked 
out the overwhelming majority of Scottish MPs from participation in government.  For the 
first time, this meant that there would be a democratic deficit in Scotland whichever party 
won most seats at UK level. 
The key assumption which underpins the democratic deficit argument is that Scotland is a 
distinct political unit, and indeed the primary political unit in which democratic majorities are 
to be calculated.  This is turn rests upon an assumption that Scotland is a nation with a right 
to political self-determination.  In this basic sense, the instrumentalist case for independence 
is as much a nationalist position as the existentialist one.  In fact, the claim that Scotland is a 
nation is not controversial.  Nationhood in general is a concept which is notoriously difficult 
to define, since it rests on subjective perception rather than on purely objective criteria.  But 
6FRWODQG¶VFODLPWRQDWLRQDOLGHQWLWy is sufficiently well accepted, internally uncontested, and 
                                                          
26
 Claim of Right (n 13) at para 3.6. 
27
 '0F&URQHµ6FRWODQG2XWRIWKH8QLRQ"7KH5LVHDQG5LVHRIWKH1DWLRQDOLVW$JHQGD¶3RO4DW
73. 
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bolstered by sufficient historical, cultural, territorial, and institutional markers, that any 
TXHVWLRQLQJRI6FRWODQG¶VQDWLRQKRRGZDVFRQILQHGWRWKHIULQJHVRIWKH1RFDPSDLJQ28 
However, the claim that Scotland, as a nation, should therefore enjoy political self-
determination is more problematic.  For some, the claim to national self-determination is 
inherently morally suspect.  For instance, Joseph Weiler has argued that the secessionist 
claims of sub-VWDWHQDWLRQV VXFKDV6FRWODQGRU&DWDORQLDDUH µHWKLFDOO\GHPRUDOL]LQJ¶ WKH\
are, he claims, LQKHUHQWO\ DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK DQ DWDYLVWLF HWKQLF QDWLRQDOLVP DQG EDVHG RQ µD
seriously misdirected social and economic egotism, cultural and national hubris, and the 
QDNHGDPELWLRQRIORFDOSROLWLFLDQV¶29  The UK ± or Spain ± as a multinational state therefore 
constitutes a morally superior site of political solidarity.   
This kind of argument is arguably misconceived, at least in the Scottish case, because it 
misunderstands both the nature of the UK and the nature of Scottish nationalism.  Keating 
DUJXHVWKDWWKH8.LVEHWWHUXQGHUVWRRGDVDµSOXULQDWLRQDO¶UDWKHUWKDQDµPXOWLQDWLRQDO¶VWDWH
In other words, it is a state in which people have plural national identities, not merely one in 
which distinct national identities co-exist.30  µ%ULWLVKQHVV¶ LV WKHUHIRUH LWVHOI D QDWLRQDO
identity, albeit based on allegiance to a political order, rather than a common ethnic 
inheritance.  However, the nationalism espoused by the SNP is equally a civic nationalism.  It 
                                                          
28
 6HHHJWKH%ULWLVKQDWLRQDOLVWEORJJHU(IILH'HDQVµ:H0XVW$WWDFNWKH613DWLWV5RRWV¶Lily of St 
Leonards blog, 18 April 2015, <http://effiedeans.blogspot.co.uk/2015/04/we-must-attack-snp-at-its-roots.html>; 
or mischievous suggestions that, if Scotland became independent, Orkney and Shetland should make their own 
claim to self-determination ± e.g., Tavish Scott MSP, quoted in Tom GoUGRQµ)RUPHU/LE'HP/HDGHU³,W¶V
6KHWODQG¶V2LO$OH[«´¶The Herald, 17 March 2013. 
29
 -++:HLOHUµ(GLWRULDO¶European Journal of International Law µ6FRWODQGDQGWKH(8D
&RPPHQW¶Verfassungsblog, 8 September 2014. 
30
 M. Keating Plurinational Democracy: Stateless Nations in a Post-Sovereignty Era (Oxford University Press 
2001) 19, 26 ± 27. 
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is not a claim based on the inherent distinctiveness of the Scots as a people, but on their 
allegiance to a distinct political system.  The argument made by critics of independence31 that 
there are only minor political differences between people in Scotland and the rUK is therefore 
broadly accurate,32 but beside the point.  What matters is the existence of a distinct Scottish 
political system.  Institutionalized political communities take on their own dynamics; and it is 
undeniable that the terms of political debate in Scotland ± for whatever reasons: different 
electoral systems; different voting patterns; different policy issues and/or policy contexts; 
different patterns of interest representation ± have diverged from those which dominate at UK 
level.33 
The choice between the UK and an independent Scotland is therefore one between competing 
versions of civic nationalism, or competing sites of political identity.34  In these 
circumstances, to prefer a priori the existing UK state to a putative Scottish state amounts 
simply to a bias in favour of the status quo, while to deny the relevance of nationhood to 
statehood altogether would be to ignore the reality of the existing state order.35   
                                                          
31
 See, e.g., Gallagher in this volume. 
32
 Successive British and Scottish social attitudes surveys suggest only slight attitudinal differences between 
Scotland and the rUK ± see <http://www.natcen.ac.uk> and <http://www.scotcen.org.uk>. 
33
 See M. Keating and M. Harvey Small Nations in a Big World: What Scotland Can Learn (Luath Press 2014) 
37 and ch 9.  However, the degree of divergence should not be exaggerated, and Jackson also points out that 
there is greater diversity in political cultures within the rUK than a focus on the UK level might suggest ± B. 
-DFNVRQµ7KH3ROLWLFDO7KRXJKWRI6FRWWLVK1DWLRQDOLVP¶3RO4DW± 54. 
34
 Keating and Harvey Small Nations (n 33) at 18. 
35
 &I1.ULVFKµ&DWDORQLD¶V,QGHSHQGHQFH$5HSO\WR-RVHSK:HLOHU¶(-,/Talk!, 18 January 2013. 
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In fact, for liberal nationalist theorists, µVHOI-determination is part of the normative content of 
QDWLRQDOLW\ LWVHOI¶36  In other words, a claim to nationhood necessarily also entails an 
entitlement to collective self-JRYHUQPHQW DULVLQJ IURP µD UHVSHFW for the freedom of 
LQGLYLGXDOV WR FKRRVH WKHLU RZQ OLYHV DQG GHWHUPLQH WKHLU SROLWLFDO IDWH¶37  Crucially, 
however, effective self-government does not necessarily require full statehood.38  Nor is the 
claim an absolute one: particular self-determination claims may have to give way to 
competing principles.39 
In the Scottish case, the ability of a distinct national identity to flourish without independent 
statehood is readily apparent.  Until relatively recently, there was no serious questioning of 
the legitimaF\RIWKH8QLRQLQ6FRWODQG+RZHYHUZKDW.LGGKDVFDOOHGµEDQDOXQLRQLVP¶40 
did not mean the suppression of Scottish difference, nor the assimilation of Scottishness to 
Britishness.  On the contrary, a commitment to the Union was consistent with the 
maintenance of substantial scope for Scottish self-government.  The Union agreement itself 
preserved significant areas of autonomy in areas regarded as particularly important ± in the 
law, the church, education, and social affairs;41 while the later growth of a centralized state 
                                                          
36
 Keating Plurinational Democracy (n 30) at 4.  See also N. MacCormick Questioning Sovereignty (Oxford 
8QLYHUVLW\3UHVVFK1:DONHUµ6FRWWLVK1DWLRQDOLVP)RUDQG$JDLQVWWKH8QLRQ6WDWH¶LQ1:DONHU
(ed) 0DF&RUPLFN¶V6FRWODQG (Edinburgh University Press 2012) 168. 
37
 Krisch (n 35). 
38
 Keating Plurinational Democracy (n 30) at 7 ± 8. 
39
 Keating Plurinational Democracy (n 30) at 28; MacCormick Questioning Sovereignty (n 36) at 174. 
40
 C. Kidd Unions and Unionism (Cambridge University Press 2008). 
41
 See L. Paterson The Autonomy of Modern Scotland (Edinburgh University Press 1994). 
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apparatus in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries was accompanied by considerable 
institutional recognition of Scottish distinctiveness.42 
From one perspective, therefore, the advent of legislative devolution in 1999 might be seen as 
a relatively minor development in the self-government of Scotland within the Union, and one 
which carries no implications for any further developments towards independence.  It merely 
added a representative and legislative body to the existing institutions of Scottish self-
government, and may be understood essentially as a defensive measure, aimed at protecting 
6FRWODQG¶VGLVWLQFWLGHQWLW\DJDLQVWSHUFHLYHGWKUHDWVWRLWVH[LVWHQFH7KHClaim of Right is in 
fact suffused with this kind of defensive language.43  On this view, the increased significance 
attached to separate political representation from the late 1960s onwards is explicable as a 
response to the relative decline of other carriers of national identity (due to processes of 
industrialization, urbanization, secularization, and the development of communications and 
democracy),44 and as a necessary bulwark against interference in Scottish civic life by over-
centralizing governments insensitive to Scottish difference.45  But following devolution, with 
Scottish control over essential aspects of Scottish life now secured, and with no other obvious 
threats to Scottish identity or culture, a move to independence may be regarded as simply 
unnecessary.46 
From another perspective, however, devolution in 1999 was indeed a constitutional turning 
point.  Here, devolution may be understood, not as a defensive measure predicated on the 
                                                          
42
 See J. Mitchell The Scottish Question (Oxford University Press 2014). 
43
 See, e.g., Claim of Right (n 13) at paras 2.2, 3.2, 6.10 and Epilogue. 
44
 Mitchell Scottish Question (n 42) at 11. 
45
 Mitchell Scottish Question (n 42) at 257. 
46
 6HHHJ3-RQHVµ([LVWHQWLDODQG8WLOLWDULDQ1DWLRQDOLVPLQ6FRWODQG¶LQ.30OOHUHGScotland 2014 and 
Beyond: Coming of Age and Loss of Innocence (Peter Lang GmbH 2015) 152. 
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insecurity of Scottish identity, but as a pure autonomy claim, deriving from a declining 
commitment to British identity, and a sense that distinct governmental institutions without a 
corresponding democratic base could no longer be seen as legitimate.  On this alternative 
view, the case for self-government is not limited to areas of pre-existing Scottish difference 
or issues which are purely of concern to Scots.  This was in any case always unconvincing as 
an explanation for the scope of devolution, and it becomes increasingly less persuasive as 
devolved competences expand.  Instead, what is constitutionally significant about devolution 
is its basis in an explicit assertion of the sovereignty of the Scottish people (reinforced by 
popular consent through a referendum), and the platform it provides for the accentuation and 
proliferation of political, institutional, and policy difference, and the assertion of further 
autonomy claims.47  If based upon a pure autonomy claim, it is of course much more difficult 
to set coherent and durable limits to Scottish self-government.  Indeed, the Scottish 
Constitutional Convention in its 1989 consultation document, Towards a Scottish Parliament 
± a document which endorsed the Claim of Right but which was subtly different in its 
analysis ± expressly acknowledged that it followed from the principle of popular sovereignty 
that the Scottish people could legitimately choose to be independent (although it did not 
necessarily follow that they would or should do so), and it also accepted that it could be 
difficult to draw a hard line between the legislative competences of the Scottish Parliament 
and matters to be reserved to Westminster.48   
The democratic deficit argument therefore has considerable normative force as a justification 
for independence and not merely for devolution.  However, it still cannot be regarded as 
conclusive.  There are two further problems to be addressed.  First, DV.HDWLQJSRLQWVRXWµLW
                                                          
47
 67LHUQH\µ)HGHUDOLVPLQD8QLWDU\6WDWH$3DUDGR[7RR)DU"¶Regional and Federal Studies 237 
at 246 ± 249. 
48
 (n 33) at 18 and  62. 
14 
 
is a logical consequence of the doctrine of self-determination that its exercise may be limited 
E\WKHHTXDOULJKWVRIRWKHUV¶49 in this case the rights of those who maintain a British national 
identity. 
This cannot be taken to mean that the desire of a majority of Scots to secede could be vetoed 
by a contrary desire of a British majority to maintain the territorial integrity of the UK, since 
that would be to subordinate the rights of a national minority to the wishes of the larger 
group.  Indeed, it has never been seriously suggested in the UK context that issues of 
territorial self-determination are for anyone other than those living in the territory in question 
to determine (although the interests of the rUK in the process and consequences of such 
decisions have certainly been asserted).50  Instead, it means that the continued British identity 
of people living in Scotland has to be taken into account. 
In fact, this is potentially problematic for proponents of independence, since it is clear that 
many people living in Scotland have a multiple national identities.  Scottish Social Attitude 
Surveys continue to show that, if forced to choose between them, a clear majority will opt for 
a Scottish rather than a British identity (65 per cent and 23 per cent respectively in 2014).51  
%XWRQWKHPRUHVXEWOHµ0RUHQR¶VFDOHD similar majority (63 per cent in 2014) will opt for 
some degree of shared Scottish and British identity, with only a minority (23 per cent in 
2014) choosing an exclusively Scottish identity.52  Indeed, British identity seems to have 
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become somewhat stronger in recent years, presumably as a direct result of the threat to that 
identity posed by the referendum itself. 
To the extent that Britishness is still regarded as a relevant political identity, then the 
democratic deficit argument loses much of its force.  If certain issues are regarded as being 
legitimately determined at UK level, then the fact that voters in Scottish constituencies 
sometimes end up with a UK government they did not support is no more constitutionally 
relevant than similar regional disparities in voting patterns elsewhere in the UK.53  Equally, if 
Scottish voters choose to support (regional) political parties which have no chance of forming 
a UK-wide government, then that is no more constitutionally problematic than a choice to 
support any other minority party.   
However, one major difficulty with this argument is the assumption that Scottish and British 
national identities map unproblematically onto the distinction between devolved and reserved 
matters, or that they could ever do so.  Political convergence and divergence between 
Scotland and the rUK is almost certain to cut across that boundary, wherever it is drawn, 
meaning that it is likely to be a continuing source of potential tension.  Accordingly, unless 
territorial difference on reserved matters, as well as devolved matters, is handled carefully, 
there is an ongoing risk that policy difference on reserved matters may escalate into a 
legitimacy deficit, particularly if the parties in power at UK and/or Scottish level have a 
political interest in provoking conflict.54 
Another problem is that national (political) identity is clearly not fixed.  While the 
independence referendum may have had the effect of strengthening British identity, it has 
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also further embedded Scotland rather than the UK as the main political frame of reference.  
The referendum debate was emphatically a Scottish debate: it was a debate conducted within 
Scotland, with limited and largely unhelpful input from the rUK; and it was a debate about 
the future of Scotland, and the best interests of the Scottish people, not one about the UK.55  
As more power is devolved to Scotland in the wake of the referendum, the political salience 
of Scotland is likely to increase, and that of the UK to decrease, even further.  Indeed, there 
are already signs that Scottish politics are beginning to trump UK politics ± for instance, the 
willingness of a majority of Scottish voters at the 2015 general election to vote on Scottish 
rather than British lines,56 and the prominence of devolved matters such as health in pre-
election debates, or the fact that the Scottish Labour party has felt the need to differentiate 
itself from the UK party on a reserved matter such as the renewal of Trident ahead of the 
2016 Holyrood election. 
As the political relevance of Britishness declines, it also becomes vulnerable to the argument 
that there are ways of giving expression to it other than through continued common 
statehood.  For instance, the Scottish Government during the referendum campaign sought to 
recast Britishness as a geographical and cultural rather than a political identity, and to stress 
                                                          
55
 6HH$0F+DUJµ$7DOHRI7ZR&RQVWLWXWLRQV¶Scottish Constitutional Futures Forum blog, 16 December 
$0F+DUJµ+DVWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRP+DGD*RRG5HIHUHQGXP"¶-XQH2014. 
56
 Whereas the contrasting results of the 2007 and 2011 Scottish Parliament elections, on the one hand, and 2010 
UK general election, on the other, suggested a significantly greater willingness to vote for the SNP in Scottish 
rather than UK elections, WKH613¶VYRWHVKDUHDWWKHUK general election (50%) was its highest ever.  
Survey evidence suggests that the SNP are most trusted to work in the long-term interests of Scotland by 
supporters of all parties; and preliminary analysis of the 2015 election also suggests a spillover effect from the 
independence referendum.  See D. McCrone Changed Utterly (2015), available 
at:<http://www.sps.ed.ac.uk/staff/sociology/mccrone_david>; E. Fieldhouse The British Electorate in 2015: the 
)UDJPHQWDWLRQRI%ULWDLQ¶V3DUW\6\VWHP(2015), available at: <www.britishelectionstudy.com>. 
17 
 
the significant ties that would remain between Scotland and the rUK notwithstanding the 
ending of the political union between them.57  Again, therefore, without careful attention to 
the continued supports for political solidarity across the United Kingdom, the democratic 
argument for independence is likely to become stronger.  
However, the second reason why the democratic argument for independence cannot be 
regarded as compelling is because the empirical evidence suggests that perceptions of identity 
DUH QRW WKH VROH IDFWRUV GHWHUPLQLQJ SHRSOH¶V FRQVWLWXWLRQDO SUHIHUHQFHV  Post-referendum 
survey evidence shows that, while people with a strong Scottish identity were more likely to 
vote Yes, and people with a strong British identity to vote No, a commitment to the Union 
was not the decisive reason why independence was rejected.  Instead, it was concerns about 
the risks and uncertainty of independence that were most important.58  What this indicates is 
that while democratic arguments are clearly important, they are not the only relevant factor in 
the design of satisfactory constitutional arrangements.  
III. Effective governance 
In fact, the democratic argument for independence was combined with a second argument 
about effective governance.  The claim was, as Alex Salmond put it during his first televised 
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debate with Alastair Darling, that µ[n]o one will do a better job of running Scotland than the 
SHRSOHZKROLYHDQGZRUNLQ6FRWODQG¶59 
,QVRIDUDVµEHWWHUJRYHUQPHQW¶PHDQVWKHSXUVXLWRISROLFLHVWKDWWKHSHRSOHRI6FRWODQGZDQW
the claim that independence will lead to better decision-making may be regarded simply as a 
variant of the democratic deficit argument.  However, understanding better government to be 
concerned, not only with the ends of public policy, but also with the means to those ends, it is 
conceptually separate: an argument about governmental capacity, rather than legitimate 
authority.   
Once again, this echoed similar arguments made by advocates of devolution.  For instance, 
WKH6FRWWLVK&RQVWLWXWLRQDO&RQYHQWLRQFODLPHGWKDWµWKHUHLVHYHU\UHDVRQWRH[SHFWWKDWWKH
people of Scotland will tackle issues that confront them more effectively than Westminster 
DFWLQJUHPRWHO\LQWKHLUVWHDG¶60  The Scottish Government asserted ± and the No campaign 
did not seek to deny ± that devolution had been good for Scotland.61  Once again, therefore, 
the independence case sought to build upon existing support for devolution, essentially to 
DUJXH WKDW µFRPSOHWLQJ¶ WKH SRZHUV RI WKH 6FRWWLVK 3DUOLDPHQW ZRXOG DOVR EH JRRG IRU
Scotland.  In support of this claim, the Scottish Government made reference to the greater 
flexibility and policy coherence that would come from having access to a full set of legal 
competences and policy levers; the greater ability to tailor policy measures specifically to 
Scottish needs; and the advantages arising from the smaller scale of government in Scotland, 
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such as greater agility, accessibility, and shorter lines of communication, the more 
manageable scale of policy challenges, and greater scrutiny of policy delivery.62 
In fact, academic analysis does support the view that small states can be more effective than 
larger ones,63 although Keating and Harvie are careful to emphasize that their success is 
dependent not simply upon their size, but upon the adoption of modes of governance 
DSSURSULDWHWRWKHLUSDUWLFXODUFLUFXPVWDQFHVµVPDOO-state governments are not merely large-
VWDWHRQHVDWDUHGXFHGVFDOHEXWQHHGTXDOLWDWLYHO\GLIIHUHQWVWUXFWXUHVDQGVNLOOV¶64   
However, the bigger problem for advocates of independence is that it is patently not always 
true that smaller governmental units are more effective.  On the contrary, there are numerous 
reasons why the pooling of sovereignty in larger political units may lead to better policy 
outcomes.  These include economies of scale ± in particular, increased policy-making and 
regulatory capacities,65 and a greater ability to manage physical and economic risks by 
pooling and sharing resources over a larger population base66 ± as well as policy spill-overs 
and externalities, which create co-ordination and collective action problems in the absence of 
joint decision-making machinery.  In addition, independent states face external constraints ± 
through international law and the exposure to international markets ± which bear particularly 
heavily on small states, and from which they may be more effectively shielded as a sub-state 
unit in a larger entity.67  In short, de jure power does not always amount to de facto power. 
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In practice, the desirability of continued integration was accepted by the Scottish 
Government, which advocated a model of independence which assumed, not isolation, but 
substantial co-operation with other states, through membership of the European Union, 
NATO, and other international organizations, and particularly through close ongoing ties 
with the rUK on a transitional or more permanent basis.  The latter included a currency union, 
a single energy market, a shared head of state, defence co-operation, shared financial 
regulation, a common travel area, reciprocal citizenship and voting rights, shared social 
security administration, co-ordinated transport networks, and shared scientific, technical, and 
research programmes.68 
Though IUHTXHQWO\GHULGHGE\1RFDPSDLJQHUVDVDPRXQWLQJWRµLQGHSHQGHQFHOLWH¶ ± a mere 
tactic designed to reassure risk-averse voters that nothing much would change upon Scotland 
becoming independent69 ± and rejected by the UK government as promising a greater degree 
of inter-state co-operation than was to be found anywhere in the world,70 this was arguably a 
VRSKLVWLFDWHGDWWHPSWWRFRPHWRWHUPVZLWKWKHFRQGLWLRQVRIµSRVW-VRYHUHLJQW\¶71  In other 
words, the Scottish Government arguably had a far better understanding than their critics of 
the inevitable constraints upon the autonomy of states in an increasingly globalized world, 
and of the non-categorical nature of contemporary statehood.72 
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However, in its acceptance that sovereignty is not an absolute, but a matter of degree, the 
independence case inevitably became vulnerable to the argument that an appropriate blend of 
autonomy and inter-dependence could more satisfactorily be achieved through a 
constitutional arrangement short of full statehood73 ± and without the rupture and transitional 
costs that independence would necessarily entail.74  Indeed, by the time of the referendum 
vote, it was just this sort of arrangement that the No campaign purported to be offering in the 
form of enhanced devolution within a reformed Union. 
Two issues are particularly problematic for advocates of independence.  The first is the 
argument that any sharing of sovereignty in the interests of effective decision-making would 
reintroduce a democratic deficit, because Scottish voters would be unable fully to control 
joint decision-making institutions.  Indeed, arguably the democratic problems associated with 
inter-governmental decision-making are worse than any legitimacy deficit within the Union, 
insofar as joint decision-making is not subject to any direct parliamentary oversight (or in the 
case of the EU, only to weak parliamentary involvement), and executive decision-making in 
the field of inter-governmental relations is notoriously difficult to hold to account.75 
There are several possible responses to this criticism.  One is to accept that there are 
necessary trade-offs between democracy and effective government.  However, just because 
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some limits on sovereignty are acceptable, it does not follow that all are.  It is not, therefore, a 
contradiction to choose to end one Union while maintaining others or entering into new co-
operative arrangements.  A second response is that any assessment of the implications of 
independence for democracy has to look at the quality of democratic engagement achievable 
under different constitutional scenarios and not merely at its formal extent.76  For instance, for 
many supporters of independence, the loss of formal democratic control over, say, monetary 
policy, was a price worth paying for independence plus a currency union because they did not 
believe that Scottish voters currently exercise meaningful control in this area given both the 
general arguments about the democratic deficit in reserved decision-making, discussed above, 
and the fact that monetary policy is in any case subject to only limited political control.77   
A final response is to point out that it is only independent statehood that places the choice in 
the hands of the Scottish people to decide when and to what extent they want to share power 
with others.78  This may be argued to be an important democratic gain from independence 
because the relative advantages and disadvantages of autonomy and co-operation are likely to 
change, both over time and from issue to issue.  While functional arguments can be made 
within a system of multi-level governance about the level at which particular powers are best 
exercised, these arguments are inherently contestable, both because conditions change and 
because functional arguments ultimately cannot be divorced from values: where powers are 
best exercised depends at least in part on what you want to do with them.79  Thus, for 
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example, the rationale for the Union has clearly changed over time, from an initial concern 
with trade and security, through a common commitment to empire and the Protestant religion, 
to a more recent concern to ensure a high standard of social protection through a common 
Welfare State ± a commitment which itself is now arguably on the wane.80  Similarly, even 
those functions which, it is generally agreed, would have to be retained at UK level within 
any continuing Union ± borders and citizenship; foreign affairs and defence; a common 
currency and single market ± are subject to a range of external constraints and co-operative 
arrangements, which highlight the contingency of any territorial division of powers.81  
Accordingly, any attempt to fix the limits of autonomous Scottish decision-making may itself 
be regarded as undemocratic, with only independent statehood ensuring that the people of 
Scotland remain in control of decisions as to how their interests are best advanced. 
This, however, leads to a different objection to the independence case, namely that a 
relationship based on self-interest is necessarily less satisfactory than one based on the 
solidarity that comes from membership of a common political unit.82  This was an argument 
VWURQJO\DGYDQFHGE\WKH8.JRYHUQPHQWZKLFKDUJXHGWKDWµ>F@R-operation between states 
LVSURIRXQGO\GLIIHUHQWIURPEHLQJSDUWRIRQHVWDWH¶83  Any post-independence co-operation 
would, it stressed, require to be in the mutual interest of both Scotland and the rUK;84 and, it 
suggested, it would in all likelihood not be in the interest of the rUK to co-operate to the 
degree proposed by the Scottish Government. 
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7RVRPHH[WHQWWKH8.*RYHUQPHQW¶VDWWLWXGHWRSRVW-independence co-operation might be 
thought to have lacked credibility;85 a position adopted for tactical reasons which, as the 
history of British relations with the Republic of Ireland may suggest, might have changed 
once faced with the reality of independence.86  However, the more serious underlying point is 
that a relationship based on self-interest, where either party may at any time choose to 
withdraw from it, is inherently unstable, and not therefore conducive to the making of 
necessary compromises.  The acceptance of permanent restrictions on sovereignty ± 
VDFULILFLQJWKHULJKWWRµH[LW¶LQUHWXUQIRUWKHH[HUFLVHRIµYRLFH¶LQDODUJHURUJDQL]DWLRQ87 ± 
may therefore be a necessary price to pay for deeper and more meaningful co-operation. 
Again, a number of responses are possible.  Once again, the difficulty is to find a way of 
dividing powers that will prove to be stable and mutually acceptable.  Approaching the issue 
from the perspective of what powers must be retained at the centre in order to maintain 
solidarity across the Union provides a decision-making criterion, but it does not necessarily 
make it any easier to agree upon the answer.  This is clearly illustrated by post-referendum 
disputes over the acceptable extent of fiscal and welfare devolution, and over the acceptable 
degree of variation in the provision and protection of fundamental rights.  It also remains 
necessary to reassure Scots that they do have a meaningful voice in the exercise of reserved 
powers.  This leads to the broader point that solidarity is not just a question of where powers 
are exercised, but also how they are exercised.  Solidarity may be undermined within a 
political union by political behaviour which weakens common commitments ± for instance, 
attacks on welfare provision, or erosion of citizenship rights ± or which stokes resentment 
                                                          
85
 See Mitchell Scottish Question (n 42) at 278. 
86
 See McHarg, Scotland and the UK (n 75). 
87
 Albert O. Hirschman Voice, Exit and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States 
(Harvard University Press 1970). 
25 
 
about perceived unfair treatment of certain territorial groups ± such as more generous public 
spending in Scotland enabled by an unequal funding formula.88  Finally, if the threat of exit is 
a destabilizing factor in relationships between states, it must also remain a problem in any 
UK constitutional order in which the right of the Scottish people (or other national groups) to 
self-determination is taken seriously.89  This brings us to the third element of the 
constitutional case for independence, which is the problematic QDWXUHRIWKH8.¶VWHUULWRULDO
constitution. 
IV. The United .LQJGRP¶VWHUULWRULDOconstitution 
The argument that aspirations for greater Scottish autonomy can be more satisfactorily 
accommodated within a reformed Union than through independence itself involves a 
constitutional claim.  It must assume that a constitutional settlement can be reached which 
provides adequate recognition for Scottish autonomy and territorial diversity, yet which 
ensures sufficient constitutional cohesion to legitimate UK-level decision-making and hold 
the state together over the long term.  Part of the case for independence, however, is that the 
8.¶VWHUULWRULDOFRQVWLWXWLRQGRHVnot adequately recognize the plurinational character of the 
state.   
In fact, in the wake of the referendum, there is substantial agreement amongst informed 
observers that reforms need to go beyond the transfer of additional powers to the Scottish 
Parliament and Scottish Government to include reforms to the territorial constitution more 
broadly.90  In this sense, the constitutional discontents underpinning support for independence 
                                                          
88
 Cf Mullen Independence Referendum (n 80) at 638. 
89
 See further Tickell in this volume. 
90
 See chapters by McEwen and Walker in this volume. 
26 
 
PD\ DJDLQ EH VHHQ DV SDUW RI WKH µXQILQLVKHG EXVLQHVV
 RI GHYROXWLRQ91  Whilst devolution 
involved radical change at the peripheries, it left the central state apparatus largely unaltered 
and key constitutional assumptions ± formally at least ± intact.  But where nationalists differ 
from unionists is in their deep pessimism about the reformability of the UK constitution.92   
There are three problems in particular with the current territorial constitution.  The issue 
raised most frequently by nationalists is the lack of security for institutions of Scottish self-
government, given the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty,93 and the lack of legal 
UHFRJQLWLRQRI6FRWODQG¶VULJKWWRVHOI-determination ± constitutional defects which were also 
identified by the architects of devolution.  For instance, according to the Scottish 
&RQVWLWXWLRQDO&RQYHQWLRQ µ>Z@HGRQRWEHOLHYH WKDW the sovereignty of the Scottish people 
can be satisfactorily protected in a constitutional settlement which establishes a Scottish 
3DUOLDPHQWZLWKLQWKH8.XQOHVVWKHSURYLVLRQVRIWKDWVHWWOHPHQWDUHHQWUHQFKHG¶94  Far from 
entrenching the Scottish Parliament, however, the Scotland Act 1998 included an explicit 
statement of the right of the UK Parliament to continue to legislate for Scotland on devolved 
matters (section 28(7)), albeit subject to the understanding that, as a matter of convention, 
this power would not normally be exercised without the consent of the Scottish Parliament 
(the Sewel Convention). 
                                                          
91
 See Mitchell 'HYROXWLRQ¶V8QILQLVKHG%XVLQHVV(n 54). 
92
 See, eg, Sturgeon Bringing the Powers Home (n 14*+DVVDQµ7KH0DNLQJRIWKH0RGHUQ613)URP
3URWHVWWR3RZHU¶LQ*+DVVDQHGThe Modern SNP: From Protest to Power (Edinburgh University Press 
2009) 14. 
93
 See 6FRWODQG¶V)XWXUH(n 17) at 336. 
94
 Towards a Scottish Parliament (n 13) at 19 (and 19 ± 21); see also Claim of Right (n 13) at para 4.8 and 
Epilogue; 6FRWODQG¶V3DUOLDPHQW6FRWODQG¶V5LJKW(n 13) at 18 - 19. 
27 
 
In fact, the standard response to complaints about lack of constitutional recognition is to point 
to constitutional practice which, it is claimed, embodies a strong political commitment to the 
permanence of devolution, and clear acknowledgment of the fact that Scotland is in control of 
its own constitutional destiny.  Indeed ± as the Scottish Constitutional Convention eventually 
came to accept95 ± it can be argued that Scottish autonomy is just as well, if not better, 
protected XQGHU WKH 8.¶V SROLWLFDO FRQVWLWXWLRQ WKDQ LQ FRPSDUDEOH ZULWWHQ FRQVWLWXWLRQDO
orders ± the unusual (in comparative terms) willingness of the UK government to concede a 
referendum on independence being a case in point.96  Indeed, it might be argued that political 
commitment is more important than legal guarantees, since in the extreme and improbable 
political circumstances in which abolition of the Scottish Parliament might be contemplated, 
legal guarantees would be unlikely to save it. 
All that accepted, however, political commitments lack the symbolic reassurance that legal 
entrenchment would deliver.  In addition, the gap between the legal and political constitutions 
is not without practical significance.97  The reality of the abolition of the devolved Northern 
Ireland Parliament and the repeated suspension of the Northern Ireland Assembly (albeit in 
very different political circumstances) stands in stark counterpoint to claims that abolition of 
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the Scottish Parliament is unthinkable.  Less dramatically, the lack of legal enforceability of 
constitutional conventions FUHDWHV D VWUXFWXUDO ELDV LQ IDYRXU RI WKH 8. *RYHUQPHQW¶V
preferred interpretation in cases where the scope of the Sewel Convention is in dispute ± as 
for example, in relation to the right of the Scottish Parliament to veto any proposed repeal of 
the Human Rights Act.98  And in relation to the independence referendum itself, while the 
8.JRYHUQPHQWDFFHSWHGWKH6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶Vpolitical mandate to hold a referendum, 
it nevertheless disputed its legal right to do so.  The resulting legal uncertainty had practical 
consequences in enabling the UK government to exert control over the terms on which the 
referendum took place, and makes the ability to hold a future referendum similarly 
uncertain.99 
In fact, amongst the recommendations of the Smith Commission, which was set up to agree 
proposals for further devolution to Scotland following the referendum, were that the Scottish 
Parliament and Scottish Government should be made permanent, and the Sewel Convention 
placed on a statutory footing.100  Provisions to give effect to these proposals have been 
included in the Scotland Bill which is, at the time of writing, being considered by the UK 
Parliament, and similar provisions are included in the draft Wales Bill.101  However, 
implementation has been accompanied by a narrative of impossibilism ± ie, of the legal 
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ineffectiveness of any attempt at entrenchment, given the doctrine of Parliamentary 
sovereignty ± and, somewhat contradictorily, by reluctance on the part of the legislative 
drafters to use language which can be read as being unambiguously intended to have binding 
legal effect.102  0RUHRYHU DOWKRXJK WKH 6PLWK &RPPLVVLRQ UHSRUW DFNQRZOHGJHG µWKH
sovereign right of the people of Scotland to determine the form of government best suited to 
WKHLU QHHGV¶ DQG µWKDW QRWhing in this report prevents Scotland becoming an independent 
FRXQWU\LQWKHIXWXUHVKRXOGWKHSHRSOHRI6FRWODQGVRFKRRVH¶103 no attempt has been made 
to give this any legal expression.  Indeed, an attempt by SNP MPs to amend the Scotland Bill 
to make it clear that the Scottish Parliament had the right to authorize another referendum 
was rejected.104  In other words, the gap between the political and the legal constitutions will 
remain.   
The second problem with the current territorial constitution is its lack of attention to shared 
rule as a counterbalance to the dispersal of power through devolution.  Mechanisms for 
shared rule are important, both to deal with the inevitable policy spill-overs, functional 
overlaps, and competence disputes that arise in any system of territorially-divided power, and 
also, as has been argued above, to take account of territorial differences on issues which 
remain reserved to the centre.  However, as Nicola McEwen discusses in her chapter,105 
devolution was accompanied by only weak and largely informal mechanisms for inter-
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governmental relations (IGR), and no reorganization at the centre to enhance territorial 
representation.106 
Despite recognition of the problem of shared rule ± the IGR arrangements were criticized by 
both the Calman Commission and the Smith Commission107 ± there have only been limited 
attempts to address it.  Following the recommendations of the Smith Commission, 
negotiations are ongoing between the UK and Scottish Governments to improve inter-
governmental working, and in particular to improve Scottish Government input into EU 
decision-making.  However, calls for the basic principles of the IGR system to be enshrined 
in statute108 have so far gone unanswered.  Reconstitution of the House of Lords as a 
territorial chamber has been mooted, but is not seriously in prospect, while the injection of an 
element of territorial representation into the House of Commons via the introduction of 
English Votes for English Laws (EVEL) is actually aimed at reducing the influence of 
Scottish (and Welsh and Northern Irish) MPs over legislation (directly) affecting England 
only.  Similarly, arguments that matters affecting the constitutional framework of the UK as a 
whole ± such as withdrawal from the EU or reform of human rights law ± should be subject 
to parallel consent in all four parts of the UK, rather than simply governed by a UK-wide 
majority, have been rejected. 
The basic difficulty in responding adequately to the problem of shared rule is one of 
constitutional asymmetry.  In part, this refers to the asymmetrical nature of the devolution 
arrangements (and in particular, the fact that England has no devolved government), which 
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has allowed devolution to be regarded as a set of discrete and self-contained constitutional 
reforms, with no implications for the constitution as a whole.  But the more fundamental 
SUREOHPLVWKHDV\PPHWU\RIWKHVWDWHLWVHOIDV0DF&RUPLFNSXWLWµWKHUHZRXOGEHDVHYHUH
democratic deficit in any blocking arrangement that enabled the two-elevenths [of the UK 
SRSXODWLRQ@WRSURWHFWWKHLUSRVLWLRQDJDLQVWWKHQLQH¶109 
The final problem with the current territorial constitution ± and which is emphasized more by 
unionists than nationalists ± is its lack of reciprocity.  In part, this is also a problem of 
asymmetry and concerns the legitimacy problems and inherent instability caused by divergent 
devolution arrangements110 ± and in particular, the perceived injustice resulting from the lack 
of any separate political representation for England.111  But it is also refers to the absence of 
any explicit mechanisms to tie Scotland ± and the other devolved nations ± into the Union.112  
In the absence of any legally recognized right to self-determination, there is also no clear 
understanding of the limits to that right: for instance, how often and in what circumstances it 
might be legitimate to hold an independence referendum ± nor any clear statement of the 
principles upon which the Union is based, which might be invoked to resolve disagreements 
about the appropriate territorial distribution of power. 
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This aspect of the territorial constitution has been almost entirely ignored post-referendum.  
Reforms to the devolution arrangements in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland are 
proceeding through discrete and unconnected processes, while reforms in England ± EVEL 
and the misleadingly-QDPHGµFLW\GHYROXWLRQ¶SURJUDPPH113 ± are in no way commensurate 
with the arrangements for self-government in the other parts of the UK.  Any notion of an 
over-arching framework for devolution thus remains radically under-developed.114  The 
essential problem here is the continued dominance of a political rather than a constitutional 
logic to devolution.115  The problems of territorial governance being addressed through 
devolution have been viewed primarily through a political (and sometimes ± as in the case of 
EVEL ± a party political) lens, to be resolved as best suits local circumstances, with no 
concern for their overall coherence or long-term implications. 
To adequately address these problems would require a root and branch overhaul of the 
territorial constitution probably including, as the Bingham Centre has recently argued, a 
written constitution.116  Yet such a prospect seems wholly unrealistic.  In the first place, there 
appears to be no political appetite for anything other than piecemeal reform.  Any attempt to 
µFU\VWDOOL]H¶117 the territorial constitution would be a major change to the deep structure of the 
constitution, which values flexibility above all else.  Such a radical departure would require 
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some precipitating constitutional impetus, which simply does not appear to be present.  As 
before the independence referendum,118 the main focus of constitutional attention at UK level 
is now on issues other than the future of the Union ± SULPDULO\%ULWDLQ¶VPHPEHUVKLSRIWKH
European Union and reform of human rights law ± and the direction of travel is back towards, 
not away from, the traditional constitutional model.   
Secondly, even if it were a realistic prospect, it is highly questionable whether a 
comprehensive constitutional resettlement would be desirable.  The value of the political 
constitution lies not just in its flexibility but also in its (sometimes strategic) ambiguity, 
which allows competing understandings of the constitution to be maintained simultaneously 
without having to be finally resolved.119  The territorial constitution above all has operated as 
DQ µincompletely theorizHG DJUHHPHQW¶;120 LW KDV EHHQ µa protean concept, taking different 
IRUPV LQ GLIIHUHQW SODFHV¶121  Any attempt to define and codify the Union therefore risks 
either being so bland and abstract as to be pointless,122 or else exposing rather than resolving 
territorial disagreement.  It may also act as an obstacle to further evolution at a time when 
understandings of the territorial character of the state are in flux.123   
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In these circumstances, evolutionary change ± or µmuddling through¶124 ± may be the best 
option on offer, and may eventually arrive at a stable equilibrium.  For instance, the claimed 
impossibility of achieving legal entrenchment of the Scottish Parliament arguably 
underestimates the extent to which the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty has been 
qualified in recent years,125 and may therefore be further qualified in future, including as a 
result of devolution.  Nevertheless, in an evolutionary constitution, there can be no certainty 
that any statutory statement of the permanence of the devolved institutions would have that 
effect.  The UK constitution is thus, by its nature, resistant to explicit steering, and in that 
sense the territorial constitution may accurately be described as unreformable.  Moreover, in 
the meantime, the management of territorial relations must remain a fundamentally political 
matter.  While attitudes to the future of the Union remain deeply polarized, there will be an 
ever-present risk that political disagreement may explode into constitutional crisis, whether 
over issues such as the scope or exercise of devolved powers, broader constitutional questions 
such as EU withdrawal, or merely the direction of public policy. 
V. The constitution of an independent Scotland 
The final element of the constitutional case for independence presented it not merely as a 
means of allowing Scotland to escape from an unsatisfactory constitutional position within 
the UK, but, more positively, as an opportunity for constitutional renewal.  In other words, 
the constitutional discontents animating the desire for independence go beyond the territorial 
FRQVWLWXWLRQ WR HQFRPSDVV D PRUH FRPSUHKHQVLYH FULWLTXH RI WKH 8.¶V SROLWLFDO V\VWHP LWV
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inadequate democracy;126 its lack of security for rights; and its over-weening executive 
power.127  Again, we see here a consistent thread between arguments for independence and 
DUJXPHQWV IRU GHYROXWLRQ  $FFRUGLQJ WR WKH &ODLP RI 5LJKW µWKH IDLOXUH WR SURYLGH JRRG
government for Scotland is a product not merely of faulty British policy in relation to 
Scotland, but of fundamental flaws in the British constitution.¶128  The Scottish Constitutional 
Convention thus sought not only decentralization of power from the UK to Scotland, but also 
WRµXVKHULQDQHZZD\ of politics that is radically different from the rituals of Westminster: 
more participative, more creative, less needlessly confrontational.¶129   
In the case of independence, the constitutional innovation was to be a written constitution, in 
contrast to thH8.¶VµXQZULWWHQ¶FRQVWLWXWLRQwhich would be developed through an inclusive 
and participatory process by an independent constitutional convention.130  According to 
1LFROD6WXUJHRQµWKHSURVSHFWRID&RQVWLWXWLRQDO&RQYHQWLRQDQGDZULWWHQFRQVWLWXWLRQDUe 
WKHPVHOYHVSRVLWLYHUHDVRQVIRUYRWLQJ<HV¶131  This was particularly important as a way of 
emphasizing why the clean break entailed by independence would be more desirable than 
simply reforming the devolution settlement.  It also served to underline the political 
differences between Scotland and the UK, being justified by reference both to the claimed 
existence of a distinct Scottish constitutional tradition (which could be more authentically 
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realized in an independent state) and to the modernization and QRUPDOL]DWLRQRI6FRWODQG¶V
governance arrangements.132 
There are several possible responses to the constitutional renewal argument.  One is to 
question the premise that independence is either a necessary or a sufficient condition for 
constitutional change.  As to the former, Jackson argues that the nationalist critique of the 
shortcomings of the British state is ground in a New Left analysis133 which  
does not seem to have been updated to take account of the large constitutional 
changes wrought by the Labour government of 1997 ± «  These fundamental 
steps towards making Britain a more plural, inclusive and democratic state ± 
regardless of whether they are ultimately far-reaching enough ± suggest a flexibility 
and capacity for reform in British political institutions that is underrated by nationalist 
critics.134 
In addition, as Page points out in his chapter, the devolved institutions in Scotland already 
enjoy considerable organizational autonomy, which is set to increase further once the 
Scotland Bill is enacted.  Undeniably, though, Scottish voters are not currently fully in 
control of their governance arrangements, which leaves them at risk of constitutional reforms 
which the majority do not support ± such as EU withdrawal or human rights reform.   
Viewed simply as an argument about where formal powers to undertake constitutional reform 
are situated, the constitutional renewal argument seems simply to be an example of the 
broader democratic case for independence.  In fact, however, the point is a different one, 
namely that a new constitutional beginning would provide an opportunity and impetus for 
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radical and comprehensive reimagining of governance arrangements that in practice is 
unlikely to occur in a continuing constitutional order ± particularly one like the UK which, as 
discussed above, combines flexibility with a fundamental constitutional conservatism.  Thus, 
while the path to a constitutional convention and permanent written constitution was clearly 
marked if Scotland had voted Yes to independence,135 it is very difficult to identify a similar 
prospect in the UK context.  Although proposals have been made for the establishment of a 
UK constitutional convention,136 the issue is not, at least for the foreseeable future, seriously 
on the political agenda.  In any case ± and partly for the reasons discussed in the last section ± 
it would be a much more complex and challenging undertaking in a UK context compared 
with an independent Scotland.137   
However, if independence would provide greater opportunities for constitutional reform, it 
does not follow that it would in fact produce substantially different outcomes.  For instance, 
while the formal design of the Scottish Parliament included some significant innovations ± 
most importantly in relation to its voting system ± the substantive implications for the 
conduct of government and politics in Scotland have been much more limited than 
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expected.138  This is because proponents of a new politics underestimated the degree of 
political continuity that devolution in fact entailed.  Given that independence would itself 
build upon devolution, there would again be substantial continuity at the level of the day-to-
day operation of the constitution which might blunt the radical edge of any formal 
constitutional changes. 
In any case, there were considerable elements of continuity in the constitutional arrangements 
proposed by the Scottish Government.  For instance, its draft interim constitution would 
clearly have involved an evoOXWLRQDU\ GHYHORSPHQW RI 6FRWODQG¶V FXUUHQW FRQVWLWXWLRQDO
framework, rather than a revolutionary change.139  There were also some more surprising 
examples of constitutional conservatism, such as a commitment to retain the monarchy, and 
not to increase the size of the Scottish Parliament.  Although these arrangements would all 
have been provisional, there was a clear danger of path dependency limiting the likelihood of 
more fundamental change being adopted in the permanent constitution. 
Further, the idea that there is a distinctive Scottish constitutional tradition which could inform 
a new Scottish constitution is itself highly questionable.140  Political actors in Scotland 
frequently appeal to a claimed Scottish tradition of popular sovereignty as opposed to 
Parliamentary sovereignty, and this principle was to be enshrined in the interim 
constitution.141  However such a claim is both of dubious historical accuracy142 and of limited 
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practical utility.  Although it says something important about the location of constituent 
power within the state, it is not clear what further implications it has for the content of the 
constitution.  Whilst the principle of popular sovereignty was invoked to justify the 
participatory constitution-making process that was envisaged,143 it is clear that in reality these 
proposals owed more to comparative experience than to indigenous constitutional practice. 
Nevertheless, the near-certainty that an independent Scotland would have ended up with an 
entrenched written constitution144 would have been a significant departure from the UK 
constitutional tradition.  In addition, the kind of constitution envisaged by the Scottish 
Government ± QRW MXVW µDSURFHGXUDO IUDPHZRUN IRUGHPRFUDWLFSDUWLFLSDWLRQ¶EXWRQHZLWK
µDQ LQVWUXPHQWDO DQG WUDQVIRUPDWLYH¶ UROH145 ± would have further accentuated the 
constitutional distance travelled.  )RU1LFROD6WXUJHRQ µ>W@KHFRQVWLWXWLRQVKRXOG«VHWRXW
the aspirations we have for our counWU\ DQG RXU YLVLRQ IRU WKH IXWXUH¶146  The Scottish 
Government therefore proposed ± albeit acknowledging that its voice would be only one 
amongst many ± that the constitution should contain extensive rights guarantees, as well as 
various substantive commitments, for instance to a ban on nuclear weapons and the 
sustainable use of natural resources.147 
In envisaging a heavily substantive constitution, though, the Scottish Government left itself 
open to charges of inappropriate politicization of the constitution, of over-judicialization, and 
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of seeking illegitimately to bind future generations.  It therefore sat uneasily with the claim 
that independence would enhance the democratic legitimacy of government in Scotland.  The 
Scottish Government could also fairly be accused of complacency about the effectiveness of 
6FRWODQG¶Vexisting democratic institutions, proposals for institutional and democratic reform 
being noticeably absent from its constitutional agenda.148  However, there were voices during 
the referendum debate calling for more radical constitutional reforms,149 and the 
constitutional convention would have provided an institutional platform for the articulation of 
such proposals ± as well as for a broader debate about the appropriate form and content of the 
constitution.   
VI. Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter has been to show that, despite the lack of clear evidence of 
constitutional discontent in Scotland ahead of the 2014 referendum, there was ± and 
continues to be ± a coherent constitutional case to be made for independence.  However, 
certain tensions within the independence case, and the contestable nature of some of its 
assumptions, mean that it can be regarded as persuasive, but not incontrovertible.  
Independence may reasonably be considered to be an answer to the problems identifiable in 
6FRWODQG¶VFXUUHQWFRQVWLWXWLRQDOSRVLWLRQEXWLWFDQQRWEHUHJDUGHGDVthe answer. 
The constitutional case for independence is also inescapably a nationalist one ± however 
uncomfortable some Yes supporters may have been with that idea.  It is a nationalist case 
because it hinges on the acceptance of the relevance of Scotland as a self-determining 
political community.  Paradoxically, however, what allowed the Yes campaign to play down 
its explicitly nationalist character is precisely the non-controversial nature of that claim in the 
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Scottish context.  That fundamental point was conceded when the Scottish Parliament was 
established in 1999.  Indeed, as I have also sought to demonstrate, there is a striking 
similarity between the constitutional arguments used to justify devolution and those used in 
support of independence. 
In part, this may have been a matter of attempting to piggy-back support for independence 
upon the popularity of devolution.  However, more fundamentally, I would argue that it also 
indicates that devolution did not fully answer the constitutional problems that its proponents 
LGHQWLILHG  )URP WKLV SHUVSHFWLYH WKH DSSDUHQW SXEOLF VDWLVIDFWLRQ ZLWK 6FRWODQG¶V
constitutional arrangements prior to 2011 may perhaps suggest quiescence rather than 
consent; in other words, it may have been attributable to the relatively favourable political 
and economic conditions during the first decade of devolution ± political alignment between 
Westminster and Holyrood and generous public spending provision ± rather than to a more 
fundamental resolution of the underlying constitutional discontents.150 
In the wake of the independence referendum, political circumstances are very different and ± 
ZKHQ FRPELQHG ZLWK HYLGHQFH DERXW YRWHUV¶ SULPDULO\ LQVWUXPHQWDO UHDVRQV IRU UHMHFWLQJ
independence ± cannot give supporters of the Union much comfort.  As I have sought to 
argue in this chapter, finding a satisfactory constitutional home for Scotland within the Union 
is not likely to be easy.  At present the constitutional direction of travel therefore appears to 
be towards greater autonomy for Scotland rather than towards any stronger cleaving to the 
Union.  Only time will tell whether Scottish voters are prepared to take the further step 
WRZDUGV LQGHSHQGHQFH ZKHWKHU WKHLU DWWLWXGH EHFRPHV RQH RI µZK\ QRW"¶ RU UDWKHU µZK\
ERWKHU"¶ 
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